We study multi-hop broadcast in wireless networks with one source node and multiple receiving nodes. The message flow from the source to the receivers can be modeled as a tree-graph, called broadcast-tree. The problem of finding the minimum-power broadcast-tree (MPBT) is NP-complete.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews the related works and explains the contribution of our work. The network model and problem statement are presented in Section III. Our game-theoretic algorithm is explained in Section IV. In Section V, a centralized approach is provided for the MPBT problem as a benchmark for our proposed algorithm. The simulation results are presented in Section VI and Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK AND CONTRIBUTION

A. Related Works
The algorithms proposed for the MPBT are usually not able to find the optimum broadcasttree, especially when the number of nodes in the network is large, but they can find a low power broadcast-tree in polynomial-time. A well-known heuristic called the broadcast incremental power (BIP) algorithm is proposed in [1] . The BIP algorithm is a centralized greedy heuristic.
To build a broadcast-tree, it starts from the source and iteratively connects the nodes to the source or to the other nodes already connected to the broadcast-tree. Considering the transmit power of the nodes which are already connected to the broadcast-tree, in each iteration, the node which requires the minimum incremental transmit power is chosen as the new node to connect to the broadcast-tree [1] . Since the BIP algorithm fails in exploiting the benefit of multicast transmission in the wireless medium, the authors of [1] further propose a procedure called sweeping in order to improve their algorithm. We refer to the BIP algorithm along with the sweeping procedure as the BIPSW algorithm. When the broadcast-tree is initialized by the BIP algorithm, the BIPSW prunes the links to the nodes which can be covered by other transmitting nodes and prevents unnecessary transmissions. Other heuristics based on minimum spanning tree [2] , [3] , ant colony optimization [4] , particle swarm optimization [5] , and genetic algorithm [6] have also been proposed during the past years for the MPBT problem which all are centralized and may perform better than the BIP algorithm at the expense of a higher complexity.
The main drawback of the centralized algorithms is their dependency on an access point. This makes the network vulnerable if the nodes lose their connections to it. Moreover, the access point needs to collect the network parameters such as the channel quality between any two nodes which is time-consuming and requires a high amount of overhead. Hence, decentralized algorithms [7] [8] [9] , by which the nodes construct the broadcast-tree just based on their local information, are a better choice for real-world implementations. Since in a decentralized algorithm the nodes update their action independently, to find a valid tree-graph as broadcast-tree, the algorithm may require to be initialized to restrict the decisions of the nodes. The authors of [9] suggest an algorithm called the broadcast decremental power (BDP) which first initializes the broadcast-tree by a centralized algorithm (Bellman-Ford), and then, every node changes its respective transmitting node if the change leads to a lower transmit power. A decentralized algorithm is also suggested in [8] , but it requires the geographical position of all the nodes of the network at every single node. In comparison to centralized algorithms, decentralized approaches for the MPBT problem have received less attention and the existing algorithms, in general, lack a good performance compared to the centralized ones.
Game theory, as a powerful mathematical tool, has been widely used for designing games for distributed optimization [11] , [12] , [18] , [19] or resource sharing in competitive situations [20] , [21] . For instance, the authors of [10] exploit a potential game to control the topology and maintain the connectivity of a multi-hop wireless network. Their proposed approach does not consider multicast transmission and requires the information from several hops to be collected at every single node. Different cost sharing schemes, each with different properties in terms of implementation difficulties or convergence to an NE, can be employed in a CSG to share the cost of a multicast transmission among the nodes. The authors of [22] studied some of the schemes that can be used for coalition formation for a single-hop multicast transmission.
In [19] and [23] , we showed that a CSG is a suitable decentralized approach to be used for modeling the MPBT problem. An important class of sharing schemes for CSGs is the class of budget-balanced schemes [24] [25] [26] . A cost sharing scheme is budget-balanced if the sum of the cost allocated to each of the receiving nodes of a multicast transmission (entities involved in a coalition) is equal to the transmit power of the transmitting node (the price of the resource used by the entities). One of the widely-adopted budget-balanced schemes is the Equal-share (ES) scheme in which the cost is simply shared equally among the nodes. Due to difficulties of designing a decentralized approach for the MPBT problem, the simplified versions of this problem have also been studied in the literature which we call the minimum-transmission broadcast-tree (MTBT) and the minimum fixed-power broadcast-tree (MFPBT) problems. In the MFPBT problem, the nodes have fixed but not necessarily equal transmit powers while in the MTBT problem, the transmit powers of the nodes are not only assumed to be fixed, but also equal for all the nodes.
In fact, the MTBT problem is a special case of the MFPBT problem and both of them are simplified versions of the MPBT problem. The ES cost sharing scheme has been employed in [11] and [12] for the MTBT and MFPBT problems, respectively. The algorithm in [11] is called GBBTC and the authors, by assuming a fixed transmit power at the nodes, minimize the number of transmissions in the network as a way to minimize the network power.
The GBBTC algorithm studied in [11] has three main drawbacks. Firstly, it does not perform power control at the transmitting nodes. Secondly, the ES cost sharing scheme employed in [11] (also in [12] ), is not applicable to the MPBT problem since the convergence of the state of the broadcast-tree to an NE cannot be guaranteed. In fact, as we will show, to ensure the convergence to an NE when using the ES cost sharing scheme, the power control feature at the nodes cannot be exploited and a fixed transmit power must be used instead. Thirdly, to find a valid tree-graph as broadcast-tree, GBBTC in [11] requires initialization.
Besides addressing these drawbacks in our proposed algorithm, we use a power model for the nodes which is more realistic than the models commonly-used in the literature [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] and show that with the proposed model the energy-efficiency of the network can be significantly improved.
B. Our Contribution
Despite its wide adoption, to the best of our knowledge, game theory has not been used for the MPBT problem in which the nodes can perform transmit power control. We propose a CSG for the MPBT problem based on the MC cost sharing scheme, in short MC, and refer to it as CSG-MC. We further study two of the well-known budget-balanced schemes, the ES and the Shapley value (SV), and compare their properties with the MC for the MPBT and the MTBT problems. We will show that the scheme based on which the cost is shared among the receiving nodes of a multicast transmission significantly impacts the performance of the game and its convergence to an NE. Although the MC is not budget-balanced, we will show that it is the only scheme for which the local objective at the nodes (cost minimization) is exactly aligned with the global objective (network power minimization). This vital property does not hold for any other cost sharing scheme for the MPBT problem. We also show that, with the MC, the optimum state of the broadcast-tree is always an NE while this does not hold in general for budget-balanced schemes. Moreover, our game-theoretic model, in contrast to other existing algorithms [1] , [9] , [11] , [12] , does not need initialization.
In the present work, we consider a more general power model than commonly-studied models in multi-hop networks [10] , [11] , [23] . Our proposed cost model consists of both transmit power for the radio link and circuitry power of a transmitting node as the total power required at a transmitting node. While most of the existing works ignore the circuitry power of wireless devices and just focus on the power required for the radio link, the circuitry power imposed on a transmitter has a significant impact on the energy consumption in a wireless network [27] . In practice, not only the circuitry power is not negligible compared to the transmit power required for the radio links, but also it can dominate when the distance between the transmitter and receiver is short [28] , [29] . For instance, if the network is dense, having a single-hop broadcast would be more energy-efficient than having multiple short hops. Note that the impact of circuitry powers cannot be seen as a fixed value on top of the result obtained by an algorithm that ignores the circuitry power. In fact, as we will show, taking the circuitry power into account may significantly change the structure of the broadcast tree and having an algorithm that captures both the device's circuitry power and radio link power jointly in broadcast-tree construction is of high importance. Table I summarizes the main differences between our work and the benchmark algorithms discussed earlier.
Finally, as the main benchmark for our algorithm, we formulate the MPBT problem as a mixed integer linear optimization problem (MILP). Although MILP formulations of the MPBT problem have been proposed in the literature, they usually do not take the circuitry power of the nodes into account. Moreover, they mostly rely on finding the optimum value of the MPBT and do not explicitly suggest how to construct the broadcast-tree [30] [31] [32] . Beside the MILP formulation of the MPBT problem, we provide a pseudo-code and explain how the optimum broadcast-tree can be constructed using the output of the proposed MILP. Notice that, since the MFPBT and MTBT problems are special cases of the MPBT problem, our proposed game can also be applied to those problems.
In summary, the main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We propose a decentralized game-theoretic algorithm for the MPBT problems using the MC cost sharing scheme that can also be applied to the MFPBT and MTBT problems. With our algorithm, while the transmitting nodes can perform power control the convergence of the game to an NE is guaranteed.
• We extensively discuss our MC-based algorithm with two other budget-balanced cost sharing schemes. We show that the MC is only scheme for which the optimum broadcast-tree is always an NE. Moreover, by using a budget-balanced scheme, the network power minimization may be in contrast to the node's cost minimization. We further show that by employing the ES cost sharing scheme an NE may not exist for the game.
• The algorithm that we proposed captures both transmit power and device's circuitry power jointly in the broadcast-tree construction. To the best of our knowledge, including the circuitry power in broadcast-tree construction has not been studied before. We show that the device's circuitry power, largely ignored by the existing algorithms, has a significant impact on the energy efficiency of the network.
• In contrast to most of the existing algorithms, our algorithm does not need to be initialized.
• An MILP formulation is proposed for the MPBT problem considering the device's circuitry power as well as an algorithm that constructs the optimum broadcast-tree.
III. NETWORK MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
A network composed of N + 1 wireless nodes with random locations in a two-dimensional plane is considered; a source S and a set W of N receiving nodes. The nodes in W are interested in receiving the source's message. We denote the set of all nodes of the network as Q = W ∪{S}.
Every node is equipped with an omnidirectional antenna and has a transmit power constraint p max j , j ∈ Q, and hence, its coverage area is limited.
In a transmission from a transmitting node j ∈ Q to a receiving node i ∈ W, nodes j and i are called the parent node (PN) and the child node (CN), respectively. The transmitting nodes transmit either by multicast or unicast. It should be remarked that, although the antenna broadcasts the message omnidirectionally, we refer to the transmission as unicast or multicast, when a PN has one or more than one intended receivers as its CNs, respectively. A CN receives the message from its own PN and ignores the messages transmitted by the other nodes. The set of CNs of PN j is denoted by M j , see Fig. 1 . It is assumed that every CN is served by just one PN and if a node j ∈ W does not forward the message to any other node, then M j = ∅.
The hardware of a wireless device is composed of several modules such as base-band signal processing unit, digital-to-analog converter, power amplifier, etc., where every component has its own power requirement for proper operation [28] . The total power required at a transmitting node consists of two main parts. The first part is the power required for the modules that mainly prepare the signal for transmission. We refer to this first part as the circuitry power of the node and denote it by p c j , ∀j ∈ Q. The second part is the power that has to be spent by a transmitter to amplify the signal, referred to as the transmit power of a node. As mentioned before, the circuitry power of a wireless device is not negligible compared to the transmit power and may even dominate it if the distance between the transmitter and the receiver is short [28] . Hence, we assume that every node j ∈ Q has a total power budget of p c j + p max j . While the circuitry power of a transmitter can be assumed as a fixed value, the transmit power needed at a transmitting node j for amplifying the signal depends on the channel quality between the transmitter and its receivers in M j and thus, it is denoted by p
. The total power required at node j for transmission to its CNs in M j is
We refer to the PN of CN i as a i such that a i = j, j ∈ Q\{i} and a = (a 1 , . . . , a N ) represents a vector whose elements are the PNs of each of the nodes in W. For the sake of notational convenience, we use P j (a) instead of P j (M j ), when required.
Note that in our model, we omit the circuitry power required for message reception as it does not affect the energy-efficiency of the network. In other words, circuitry power required for receiving data, usually a fixed value, is needed at every node that aims to receive the message and this energy does not depend on the network topology.
The power p out j of the signal emitted from the antenna of a transmitter j depends on the efficiency of its power amplifier, denoted by η j with 0 < η j < 1, as is given by [29] 
For the message reception, a threshold model is considered in the network, that is, a minimum signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), denoted by γ th , is required at a CN for successful reception of the message transmitted from its PN. In other words, the bit-error rate is assumed to be negligible considering γ th . We assume that the statistical properties of the channel remain invariant during the data transmission. Let g i,j be the channel gain between the PN j and the CN i. By treating interference as noise and denoting their joint power at the receiver i as σ 2 , the SNR of the signal received by CN i is given by
Based on the minimum required SNR γ th at CN i, and using (2) and (3), the transmit power required at a transmitting node j for transmission to a receiving node i is given by
Notice that p req i,j takes the efficiency of the power amplifier of the transmitting node into account. Our algorithm can employ any decentralized channel access scheme suitable for multi-hop communications [33] [34] [35] . For instance, as proposed in [33] , a single, time-slotted channel can be used that consists of two sections, the first section as random access and the second section as scheduled access. The first section is contention-based and used for signaling message exchanges while the transmissions by the PNs are carried out during the scheduled access section. During the first section, the nodes send their requests to their chosen PNs for joining them. When a node, say j, is chosen as a PN by another node in the network during the random access section, it reserves a time-slot for itself in the scheduled section and broadcasts this information immediately in its neighboring area so that the other nodes find that this time-slot has been reserved by node j.
Clearly, if the node j had already been chosen as a PN by other nodes, it does not require to reserve q new time-slot. The index of the slot reserved by PN j must be greater than that reserved by its own PN whose distance to the source, in terms of the number of hops, is shorter. Note that the random access section is prone to collision and if a collision occurs, the nodes have to back off for a random interval. Since such a channel access scheme requires time synchronization at the nodes, it is common to use the clock of the source as a reference clock. The synchronization can be done using a dedicated time-slot via a single-hop transmission by the source, if the nodes can be reached by the source, or can be done hop by hop from the source toward the leaves of the broadcast-tree [36] . We assume that synchronization in the network is attained.
It is important to remark that in this paper, we do not focus on channel access optimization.
Indeed, in this work, given a channel access method for multi-hop networks, we propose a decentralized algorithm that finds an energy-efficient broadcast-tree to be used for data dissemination during the scheduled access section. It should also be noted that, although the signaling messages impose additional energy consumption on the network, we assume that the imposed energy is negligible compared to that required for the actual data dissemination. We further discuss the overhead issue in the next section.
Due to the transmit power constraint, a node j can be a PN of node i if the power required for the link between the nodes j and i is less than p max j . The set of neighboring nodes of node i is denoted by N i and defined as
It is assumed that every node knows the channel gains of the links to its neighboring nodes.
We specifically denote the unicast transmit power required for the link between node j and its neighboring node i as p Fig. 1 . Moreover, considering the circuitry power of PN j, the total power required for a unicast communication at PN j is equal to
In case of multicast transmission, where a parent node j has multiple CNs, the total required power at a PN j in (1) is given by
Finally, the total required power in the network for message dissemination among all the nodes, simply termed the network power, is calculated by
It should be remarked that the message flow from the source to the nodes must result in a tree-graph, rooted at the source without any cycle. When a cycle occurs in a graph, a part of the network loses its connections to S. We define the route of a node as the set of the nodes which are on the route from S to node i, including node i, and denote it by R i . For instance, R w = {w, u, k, S} for the given broadcast-tree in Fig. 1 . The route of S is set to R S = {S}. If node i chooses PN j, R i can be simply found as
The network-wide objective, which is also referred to as the global objective, is to minimize the network power defined in (8) such that every receiving node in W receives the source's message from a node j ∈ Q\{i} and has the source in its route as
Since every node i ∈ W is allowed to choose one PN and the source must be in the route of the PN, i.e., S ∈ R j , the constraints above give us a tree-graph.
IV. GAME-THEORETIC ALGORITHM
A. Game design and properties
The game is characterized by the set W of non-cooperative and rational nodes, that is all the nodes in the network except the source. The proposed game is a dynamic (iterative) game such that at every iteration t, one of the nodes of the network takes one of its possible actions from its action set. The action of a node i ∈ W in this game is to choose another node j ∈ Q\{i} as its PN to connect to and receive the source's message from. We denote the action of node i as
i is the action set of player i at iteration t. The action profile of the game is
N is the joint action set of the game at iteration t. The action profile of the game can also be denoted by a = (a i , a −i ) in which a −i represents the actions of all the players except node i. The total power required in the network depends on the action profile of the game, i.e., which nodes are chosen as PNs. We denote the action profile corresponding to the optimum broadcast-tree by a opt . Based on the action profile of the game at iteration t, i.e., a ∈ A (t) , a non-negative cost is assigned to every player of the game.
The cost function is defined as
the positive real numbers. We show the cost of node i in case of choosing PN j as
since the cost just depends on the set of the nodes who choose the same PN. The non-cooperative dynamic game G is defined formally by the tuple
The game G is a child-driven game, that is, a node as a child selects another node in its neighborhood with minimum cost as its PN. The action set of a node has to be defined in a way to ensure that no cycle occurs in different iterations of the game. Based on definition, a cycle occurs in a rooted tree when a node i ∈ W connects to one of its descendants [37] ; The descendants of a node j ∈ Q are all the nodes who have the node j on their route to S and a cycle occurs if it chooses one of its decendents as its PN. For instance in Fig. 1 , if node k chooses node w as its PN. Denoting the route of node j at iteration t by R (t) j , we define the action set of a node i ∈ W at iteration t as all the neighboring nodes of node i except its descendants as
in which S ∈ R (t−1) j indicates node j in order to be a PN of node i must be connected to the broadcast-tree. For simplicity, we omit the time indicator t in the A (t) .
In order to benefit from the broadcast nature of the wireless channel, the cost of the nodes should be defined in a way to motivate the CNs to form a multicast group and choose a common PN. Moreover, the circuitry power of a transmitting node must also be considered in the cost model. The cost function in this game, based on the MC principle [17] , is defined as
in which M j \{i} represents the set of CNs of PN j except the CN i. Roughly speaking, the cost of node i is the difference in the total power required at node j with and without node i.
Based on (12), a positive cost is assigned to the CN that requires the highest unicast transmit power from PN j while the cost assigned to other CNs in M j is zero. the game G with the MC, defined in (12), as its cost function is called the CGS-MC.
To illustrate the cost model in (12) , let us assume that node i and node l require the highest and the second highest unicast powers form PN j, respectively, see Fig. 1 . In this case, the cost assigned to the CN i using (12) is given by
In this case, either i ∈ M j or i / ∈ M j , the circuitry power is consumed at PN j as it must serve the CN l. Therefore, no additional power, here the circuitry power, is imposed on PN j by CN i and hence, the circuitry power of PN j does not appear in the cost assigned to the CN i. Moreover, if we assume that the CN i is the only CN of the PN j, then based on (12), the cost of CN i contains the circuitry power of PN j, i.e., C
That is, since in this case both transmit and circuitry powers are imposed on the PN j by the CN i, the circuitry power appears in the cost assigned to the CN i as well as the unicast transmit power. Therefore, depending on the structure of the broadcast-tree and the transmission scheme (unicast or multicast), the cost model in (12) treats the circuitry power intelligently. The proposed cost model keeps or removes the circuitry power from the cost of receiving nodes to, respectively, prevent establishing a new unicast transmission or motivate the nodes to form a multicast receiving group and reduce the number of transmissions. Whether joining a multicast group is better than establishing a unicast is decided by the node based on its cost function.
We employ the best response dynamics for game G such that at every iteration of the game, one of the players chooses an action as its best response to the action of other players. The best response of player i, which is also referred to as the local objective, is defined as
Note that the nodes are not restricted to take their actions one after another. It is indeed possible to have multiple actions at the same time but, due to the utilization of a shared randomaccess channel for updating the broadcast-tree, a collision occurs if two neighbor nodes send their requests simultaneously. In such a case, they must back off for random intervals to send their requests again. That said, the best-response dynamics still can be seen as a fair approach for studying the network. This approach helps us reaching an equilibrium in polynomial-time for the class of potential games [38] . Later in this section, we will show that the game G is a potential game. Finally, we consider an NE as the converging point of the state of the broadcast-tree.
Definition 1. (NE)
An action profile a * ∈ A is an (pure) NE of the game G if
B. Convergence and Discussion
In this subsection, we discuss the properties of the game described in the previous subsection.
We first show that the game converges to an NE. Then we discuss the properties of the game.
Definition 2. (Potential game)
A game G is an exact potential game [39] if there exists a function Φ : A → R, called the potential function, such that for every i ∈ W, a i , a i ∈ A i ,
Theorem 1. The game G with the proposed MC cost sharing scheme is an exact potential game with the potential function
Proof: We verify (16) with the cost function and the potential function, introduced in (12) and (17), respectively. Let us assume that node i ∈ W, as a CN of PN j ∈ Q\{i}, changes its PN to PN k ∈ Q\{i, j}, i.e., a i = j and a i = k, see Fig. 1 . With such a transition, just PN j and PN k will be affected among the PNs in the network. Thus, the network power, here the potential function of the game, can be written as
The cost of node i when i ∈ M j is given by
and the cost assigned to node i when it joins PN k is
Using (19) and (20), the potential function in (18) when a i = j and a i = k are given by
and
respectively. Then, using (21) and (22) we have
Corollary 1. The local objective in the game G is exactly aligned with the global objective defined in (10) if and only if the cost of the nodes is defined based on the MC.
Corollary 2. The best response dynamics converges to an (pure) NE for the game G.
Proof: Since the game G is an exact potential game, it possesses a pure NE [39] . An NE of the game is any action profile a * that (locally) minimizes the potential function in (17) . When a node updates its action in order to reduce its cost, based on Theorem 1 the same reduction occurs in Φ. As Φ, i.e., the network power, is bounded from below, after some iterations the game G reaches a state at which none of the nodes can further reduce its own cost given the action of other nodes. Proof: Since the best response of each node can be found in polynomial time and since the game is a potential game, the proposed algorithm is PLS-complete [12] , [38] .
Theorem 2. Using MC, a opt is always an NE of the game G.
Proof: Recall that a opt is the action profile of the game associated with the optimum broadcast-tree. Let us assume that the a opt is not an NE. Therefore, based on the definition, at least one of the nodes of the network can update its action to reach a lower cost. As showed in Theorem 1, reduction in the cost of a node results in the same reduction of Φ, that is, the network power. This is a contradiction as the broadcast-tree of a opt is optimum.
In a CSG with MC as the sharing scheme, the aggregated cost paid by CNs is not necessarily equal to the total power required at their corresponding PN. This property makes the MC a nonbudget-balanced scheme. We now discuss the properties of ES and SV schemes if one applies them to the MPBT problem. ES and SV are two of the widely-adopted budget-balanced schemes in the field of CSGs and are known to be fair depending on the application [40] , [41] .
Definition 3. (Budget-balanced cost sharing scheme [17] ) A cost sharing scheme 
Theorem 3. With a budget-balanced cost sharing scheme, a opt is not necessarily an NE.
Proof: We first show that with a budget-balanced cost sharing scheme, the local objective in (14) is not necessarily aligned with the global objective in (10) . Using the definition 3 and by a summation over all the nodes j ∈ Q we have
The left side of (27), i.e., j∈Q i∈M j C BB i (j, M j ) represents the total cost received by the PNs j ∈ Q which is equal to the cost paid by the CNs i ∈ W. Therefore, we replace the left side of (27) with i∈W C BB i (a) and rewrite it as
By expanding the left side of (28), the cost of node i is given by
in which P net (a) is defined in (8) . Eq. (29) indicates that a node i ∈ W deviates form the action a i (in action profile a), if the combination of the network power and the cost of the other nodes reduces. This shows that deviation from a ∈ A may not merely result in network power reduction. Since a opt ∈ A, the global optimum is not necessarily an NE.
Theorem 3 is further illustrated in Fig. 2 . In Fig. 2 , net represents the part of the network, with power P net (a ), which is not affected by the action of the node i. Using the ES scheme in this network, employed in [11] and [12] , node i updates its action from a i = j to a i = k to reduce its cost from (p
k , this action reduces the cost of node i from 3 to 1.5 while at, the same time, it increases the network power by 1 unit, that is,
Note that, using the SV defined in (25) leads to the same conclusion as the node i reduces its cost from 3.5 to 2.5 by the same action. In case of employing the MC in this example, node i does not change its action since it increases its cost from 1 to 2.
In the rest we further investigate the properties of ES and SV in comparison to MC. Before that we define the following property for a cost function.
Definition 6. (cross-monotonicity) A cost function C(.) is cross-monotone if [17]
Roughly speaking, if the set of CNs of PN j ∈ Q expands, the cost of the nodes who already chose the PN j must not increase. This property for the convergence of the game is intuitive.
When the cost is not cross-monotone, by joining a new node to the multicast group, the other nodes leave the group if their cost increases. This may result in instability.
Lemma 1.
A necessary condition of a budget-balanced cost sharing scheme to guarantee the existence of an NE is cross-monotonicity [44] .
Theorem 4. The ES does not guarantee the existence of an NE for the game G.
Proof: It is easy to see that based on Definition 6, the ES is not cross-monotone and hence, based on Lemma 1 the convergence to an NE is not guaranteed. Moreover, we provide an instance of the network in Fig. 3 for which the ES scheme does not lead to an NE. In this figure, updating the action at node i increases the cost of node v and vice versa. Hence, the nodes i and v iteratively update their actions and the game G does not converge.
Lemma 2. The ES is a special case of the SV when the contributions of the CNs in a multicast
receiving group on the power of their PN are assumed to be equal.
Note that for the MTBT problem where the transmit powers are all equal and fixed (and their values do not matter), the ES shares the cost as C Theorem 5. The ES grantees the existence of an NE for the MFPBT (and MTBT) problem.
Proof: As stated in Lemma 2, the ES scheme is a special case of the SV when the contributions of the receiving nodes are assumed to be equal. This is the case for the MFPBT problem where the transmit power of a PN, regardless of the powers required for the unicast links, is fixed. Hence, using the ES for the MFPBT problem can be seen as a special case of the MPBT problem with the SV scheme. Since based on Lemma 3, the SV guarantees the existence of equilibrium for the MPBT problem, the ES does so for the MFPBT problem.
Based on Definition 6, it is straightforward to see that the ES is cross-monotone for the MFPBT problem.
Note that, in designing games for decentralized optimization, the elements of the game such as cost function, action sets and the strategy of the nodes have to be designed in a way to guarantee that the individual local behavior of the players is desirable from the global system point of view. Moreover, the implantation of different cost sharing schemes differs in terms of the information overhead they require. The ES is the simplest one since a node, to calculate its cost, just requires knowing the number of CNs in a multicast receiving group. With MC, every node needs to know the highest and the second highest unicast powers required by the CNs of a PN. Finally, the SV imposes the highest overhead on the network. To calculate the cost using the SV, a node must know the unicast power required of every individual CN in a multicast group.
The information required for decision making has to be transmitted in a neighboring area by every node as overhead information via a broadcast channel. Table II summarizes the properties of the different cost sharing schemes. The comparison in terms of overhead is relative.
In conclusion, based on what has been discussed and using Table II , we can find that the MC has two main advantages over the SV for the MPBT problem. Firstly, with MC, unlike SV or any other budget-balanced cost sharing scheme, a opt is always an NE. Secondly, the required overhead information for MC is lower than that of the SV. This becomes more important when the size of the multicast receiving group increases. Note that here we do not consider the ES for the MPBT problem due to the lack of convergence guarantee.
The efficiency of a game-theoretic scheme can be studied by analyzing the worst-case outcome for which the measures of the price of anarchy (PoA) and the price of stability (PoS) are used. 
, and (31)
Observation 1. The PoS of the proposed game is 1.
Proof: Based on Theorem 2 a opt is always an NE of the game G, thus, PoS(G) = 1.
Note that, thanks to employing the MC, the PoS is 1. If one uses a budget-balanced scheme for this problem, then based on Theorem 3, PoS(G) > 1.
We provide a lower bound for the PoA of our game considering the circuitry power as zero and assuming the channel gains modeled by path-loss with path-loss exponent equal to 2 so that
i,j in which r i,j is the distance between the nodes i and j.
Theorem 6. By defining n = |Q| 3 in which . is the floor operator, the lower bound of the PoA of our game is given by
in which
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix I.
V. CENTRALIZED APPROACH
In this section, we model the MPBT problem of (10) as an MILP. The provided MILP mainly finds the optimum value of the network power by finding the nodes that should act as transmitting nodes as well as their transmit power. It does not determine the structure of the optimum broadcast-tree. We first provide the MILP for the MPBT problem and then propose an algorithm by which the structure of the optimum broadcast-tree can be found based on the solution of the MILP. Before providing the MILP formulation, we define the following vectors and variables and, later in this section, explain them by a toy example:
• Transmission vector: the transmission vector is used to determine whether a node j ∈ Q acts as a transmitting node or not. Moreover, in case that node j is a transmitting node, it determines the CN of PN j that requires the highest unicast power. The transmission vector is defined as t j = [t 1,j , . . . , t N,j ] T , j ∈ Q as an N × 1 vector such that t i,j ∈ {0, 1} and t i,j = 1 if and only if node i is the CN of PN j that requires the highest unicast power among all nodes in M j . Moreover, t j ≤ 1 in which . represents the norm operator. If node j is a transmitter, then t j = 1, otherwise t j = 0.
• Reachability vector: it determines that if a node i ∈ W is a CN of PN j with highest required unicast power, given P T , j ∈ Q is an N × N binary matrix with r i,j the reachability vector.
• Downstream value: the downstream value d i,j is defined for the link between any two nodes j and i in Q and shows the total number of nodes in the network that rely on the transmission from PN j to CN i for receiving the source's message.
Since the outcome of the MILP must be a tree graph rooted at the source, i.e., S ∈ R i .∀i ∈ W, three conditions for the downstream have to be met [11] . Firstly, the source node cannot be in the downstream of any other node as it is not a CN for other PNs. Secondly, the number of downstream nodes of the source node must be equal to N , as the whole network is connected to the source, either directly or indirectly. Finally, the difference between the sum of the downstream values of the links coming in and going out of a node in W must equal to 1.
We explain the defined vectors and matrices in detail using the illustration shown in Fig. 4 .
In the broadcast-tree of Fig. 4 , the source node multicasts the message to node 1 and node 2.
Then, node 2 forwards the message to nodes 3 and 4. p Variables t i,j and d i,j are to be found by the MILP for all i, j ∈ Q, while R j can be obtained based on the unicast power required between the nodes. Based on the unicast power for each link shown in Fig. 4 , the reachability matrix for S is given by
The entries of the last row in (35), i.e., r 4,S , are all zero as node 4 and S are no neighbors, that is, node 4 cannot be reached by S due to the power constraint at S. It can be seen in (35) that
1,S and r
1,S are equal to 1. Recall the entries of r i,j show the nodes that can receive the message from PN j without additional transmit power at node j if the transmit power of node j is equal to p uni i,j . This shows that if the source node transmits to node 1, then, node 2 can also receive the source's message by a multicast transmission without additional transmit power. In order to find which of the nodes of the network are covered by PN j based on its transmission, we define y j = [y 1,j , . . . , y N,j ]
T as
More precisely, y j is equal to one of the reachability vectors of node j depending on its transmission matrix t j . In the broadcast-tree shown in Fig. 4 , t S = [1, 0, 0, 0] T . Using (35) and (36), we have y S = r
The MILP for the MPBT problem is provided in Fig. 5 . P uni i,j in (37a) is defined in (6). Eq. (37b) expresses that the source node must be a transmitter while the other nodes j ∈ W are not necessarily a transmitter. The constraints in (37c) and (37d), as stated before, guarantee that the resulting tree is a broadcast-tree rooted at the source. The values of y i,j , found by (36) , are used in (37d) to find the downstream values of the links between the nodes. Eq. (37d) represents the constraint on the downstream values. More precisely, y i,j = 0 in (37d) indicates that, for a given t j , node i cannot be covered by node j and the downstream value of the link between the nodes j and i must be zero, that is, d i,j = 0. Finally, it should be mentioned that the proposed MILP can also be used for the MFPBT and the MTBT problems [11] , [12] , however, due to the fixed transmit power, the number of constraints for the MFPBT problem will be much lower than that of the MPBT problem. In fact, since every node has only two choices, that is, whether to transmit or not, there will be only a reachability vector for the nodes and no reachability matrix.
By the solution of the MILP, a node j ∈ Q is a transmitting node if t j = 1 and its transmit power is equal to p
As a node can be covered by multiple transmitting nodes in the network, an algorithm is required to find the set M j of each PN j ∈ Q in the optimum broadcast-tree as well as the route R i of every receiving node in W. To this end, we suggest Algorithm 1. In this algorithm, using the solution of the MILP and starting from the source, node i ∈ W is a CN of node j if y i,j = 0 and node i has not been already connected to the broadcast-tree. The set C in this algorithm refers to the set of nodes which are connected to the broadcast-tree. This set at first contains S and the algorithm is run until all the nodes of the network are added to this set. The algorithm visits the nodes one by one to see if based on the solution of the MILP, a given node must be a PN of other nodes or not. In this algorithm, the set of visited nodes by the algorithm is given by V. The number of binary variables that have to be determined with the proposed MILP are N binary variables for the source and, as t j,j = 0 and t S,j = 0, a number N − 1 of binary variables for each of the N nodes in W. Thus, the total number of binary variables for the proposed MILP is N + N (N − 1) = N 2 .
Algorithm 1 Constructing the optimum broadcast-tree
for each node j ∈ C \ V do 4:
if y i,j = 0, i ∈ N j , i / ∈ C then 6:
end if 10:
end for 11: end while
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
A. Simulation Setup
For simulation, a 250m×250m area is considered in which the coordinate of a node is determined by (x, y) with x and y as independently and uniformly distributed random variables in the interval [0, 250]. The total number of nodes varies between 10 and 50.
The simulation results are based on the Monte-Carlo method and in each simulation run, one of the nodes in the network is randomly chosen as the source. The channel is based on the path-loss model. Let l i,j and l 0 be the distance between nodes i and j and a reference distance, respectively. Then, by considering α as the path loss exponent and λ as the signal wavelength, the power gain of the channel between nodes i and j is defined as
During the simulation, we set λ = 0.125m, r 0 = 1m and α = 3. Moreover, using [28] , we assume uniformly distributed random values for p of the maximum power budget of the nodes denoted byP max , i.e.,P
The normalized network power is then denoted byP
is defined in (8) . The simulation has been carried out in MATLAB and the proposed MILP is solved using CVX and Gurobi.
We compare our approach with other benchmark algorithms as they have been proposed and without any changes. For instance, in terms of the circuitry power, the benchmarks ignore it and we also implement them in this way. After constructing the broadcast-tree by those algorithms, we consider the circuitry powers in calculating the actual network power. Modifying those algorithms in a proper way to consider the circuitry power is out of the scope of our work. Furthermore, we aim at emphasizing on the impact of the circuitry power which has been largely ignored by the existing algorithms and showing that the broadcast-tree resulting from those algorithms are not efficient.
B. Results
Fig . 6 compares the normalized network power versus the number of nodes for different algorithms for the MPBT problem. The benchmark algorithms, except the MILP, do not consider the circuitry power during the broadcast-tree construction. As can be observed, our proposed algorithm outperforms other benchmark algorithms. The main reason is that our algorithm, besides the transmit power, considers the amount of circuitry power of the nodes and adapts the broadcast-tree based on that. In a dense network, the effect of the circuitry power on the network power is significant. In our algorithm, by increasing the number of nodes, the network power first starts increasing and then tends to saturate. When the number of nodes in the network increases, the distances between the nodes and consequently the transmit powers required between the nodes reduce. Despite the fact that the required transmit powers reduce, the number of transmitting nodes in the network increases and since each transmitting node imposes a fixed power on the network, which is not negligible, the network power increases. When the network becomes dense, the number of transmitting nodes required to cover the whole network, as well as the network power, remains roughly the same. Fig. 7 compares the three main cost sharing schemes discussed in this paper, that is, the MC, the SV, and the ES the in terms of the total normalized network power versus the number of nodes in the network. We replace the MC cost sharing scheme in CSG-MC with SV and ES and refer to them as the CSG-SV and the CSG-ES, respectively. Due to the lack of convergence guarantee with the ES scheme, the transmit power of the nodes for the CSG-ES, as well as for the GBBTC, are assumed to be fixed and equal to 200 mW. In this experiment, all the algorithm, except the GBBTC, consider the circuitry power in broadcast-tree construction. In fact, the only difference between GBBTC and CSG-ES is that GBBTC relies merely on the transmit power.
There are two main observations in Fig. 7 . First, performing power control at the nodes and taking the circuitry power into account, which is the case for the CSG-MC and CSG-SV, significantly improves the energy-efficiency of the network. For instance, in a network with |Q| = 40, the normalized network power obtained by CSG-MC isP net (a) 5. This number for the GBBTC (an also for BIPSW in Fig. 6 ) is more than 8 which means that the broadcast-tree obtained by our algorithm requires around 40% less energy. The second observation is that the MC performs slightly better than the SV. This observation is in accordance with Theorems 2 and 3. Aside from the performance, the information overhead required for the MC is much lower than that of the SV and this makes the MC the best choice for such a network. Although the transmit power of the nodes is fixed for both the GBBTC and the CSG-ES, the network power with CSG-ES is less than that of the GBBTC. This is because, unlike the GBBTC, the CSG-ES considers the circuitry power in broadcast-tree formation and thus, less number of nodes act as PN.
In Fig. 8 , we depict the number of iterations required for each of these algorithms to converge.
The number of iterations of an algorithm can also represent its time complexity. As can be observed, the CSG-MC algorithm requires the lowest number of iterations among all. Moreover, the SV-based CSG requires a higher number of iterations than the MC-based CSG. This difference stems from the way these algorithms share a cost among the receiving nodes of a multicast group.
With MC, the cost of all CNs except one of them is zero, and hence, the CNs have no incentive Finally, to have a better insight about how the algorithms construct the broadcast-tree, a realization of the network with |Q| = 20 nodes is presented in Fig. 10 . In this figure, the broadcast-tree is constructed with four algorithms; the optimum broadcast-tree in Fig. 10 (b) and (e) based on the centralized MILP approach along with the Algorithm 1 explained in Section V, the proposed decentralized game theoretic algorithm in Fig. 10 (c) and (f), the GBBTC [11] in (a) BIPSW [1] (b) Optimum -p Fig. 10 (a) , node 2 receives the message from the source by a unicast transmission and sends it to its CN, i.e., node 3, again by a unicast. Node 3 then forwards the message to its CNs, node 1 and 5, via multicast. In Fig. 10 (a) , we first find that the BIPSW constructs the broadcast-tree mostly with short hops including many unicasts. This is because the BIPSW relies merely on minimizing the transmit powers. For the given instance, BIPSW requires 14 transmissions in total where 11 of these transmissions are via unicast. In contrast to BIPSW, the GBBTC in Fig. 10 (d) , due to the fixed transmit power of the nodes, tends to form large multicast groups to reduces the number of transmissions.
Our proposed algorithm, as well as the optimum MILP-based broadcast-tree, are flexible.
When the circuitry power is very low, the obtained broadcast-trees, similar to that obtained by the BIPSW, will be constructed by short hops and the unicast transmission is used relatively more often. For instance, with p c j = 25 mW, the broadcast-tree constructed by our algorithm in Fig. 10 (c) contains 10 transmissions including 6 unicasts. With the optimum MILP algorithm in Fig. 10 (b) , 11 transmissions are needed with also 6 unicasts. When the circuitry power increases to p c j = 150 mW, in the same network, the number of transmissions with our algorithm becomes 6 including 1 unicast (Fig. 10 (f) ), while, the optimum broadcast-tree ( Fig. 10 (e) ) consists of 5 transmissions, all via multicast. In fact, when the circuitry power, as a fixed term that affects the total transmit power of a node, dominates the transmit power, our proposed algorithm as well as the MILP, tend to exploit the multicast transmission. In other words, it adapts itself depending on the value of the circuitry power.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a non-cooperative cost sharing game with MC cost sharing scheme has been proposed for the MPBT problem in multi-hop wireless networks. The proposed game has been shown to be a potential game with guaranteed convergence. We showed that the MC cost sharing scheme is the only scheme for which the optimum broadcast-tree is always an NE of the game.
Besides, the information overhead required for it is relatively low. These two properties make it the best choice among the cost sharing schemes for such a problem in terms of both performance and required information overhead. Unlike many of the existing algorithms, our proposed model not only captures the circuitry power of a device together with its transmit power, but also the nodes in our algorithm are able to perform transmit power control. It has been shown that the proposed algorithm and the considered power model significantly improve the network energyefficiency.
VIII. APPENDIX I
In this section we provide a lower bound for the price of anarchy (PoA) of our game. We find an instance of an NE for which the network power compared to the global optimum is bad. We calculate the lower bound for a path-loss channel with path-loss exponent equal to 2. Further, the circuitry power is assumed to be zero (p c j = 0, ∀j ∈ Q). Fig. 11 : Broadcast-tree a 1 . Fig. 12 : Broadcast-tree a 2 . Fig. 13 : Broadcast-tree a 3 .
Based on these assumptions, the channel gain between the nodes i and j can be represented as g i,j = 1/l 2 i,j in which l i,j is the distance between them. Using Eq. (4), the maximum transmit power is given by
in which l max is the radius of the biggest area that can be covered by node j (depending on γ th ). We normalized all the distances in the network to l max so that the distance between any neighboring nodes i and j is 0 ≤ l i,j ≤ 1 in which 1 represents the l max . We further normalize all the link powers to γ th σ 2 η j , so that the transmit power between nodes i and j can be represented as p uni i,j = (l i,j ) 2 and the maximum transmit power is given by p max = 1.
Let us consider a network in which the receiving nodes are distributed on two circles as shown in Fig. 11 : An inner circle with radius r on which n nodes are evenly distributed and an outer circle with radius 1 and 2n nodes on it such that |Q| = 3n + 1, n ≥ 1 in which |Q| is the total number of nodes in the network. The broadcast-tree shown in Fig. 11 is the optimum broadcast-tree with P net (a 1 ) = 1 for which the cost of all the nodes, according to the marginal contribution (MC) scheme, is zero. Figure 12 and 13 are also representing two other NEs for the game with action profiles a 2 and a 3 , respectively. The network power for these broadcast-trees are higher than P net (a 1 ).
Let us consider the state of a broadcast-tree in which one of the nodes on the inner circle has two CNs while the other nodes have no CN, see Fig. 14. As depicted in Fig. 14 , node i has to choose a PN for itself in order to join the broadcast-tree. In this figure, node k has two CNs while node j has no CN. One can show that when r is small and n is large, the broadcast-tree a 3 (shown in Fig. 13 ) will be formed since based on the MC cost sharing scheme, the cost of node i in a multicast transmission by PN k will be less than the cost of a unicast by PN j, that such an transition occurs. Since the CN i changes its PN from k to j to reduce its cost, based on Theorem 1, the same reduction occurs in the network power. Then, the highest network power belongs to broadcast-tree P net (a 2 ) at the transition radius r 0 . Since this transition depends on n, in the sequel we find r 0 as a function of n. Then we calculate the PoA.
As shown in Fig. 15 , since we have n nodes on the inner radius, then, α = 2π/n. Moreover, since the triangle Sjk is an isosceles triangle, then, we have θ = π/2 + π/n − ζ and l jk = 2r sin(α/2) = 2r sin(π/n).
Further, in ijk and by using the relation cos(π/2 + x) = − sin(x) we can find l 
Based on the MC cost sharing scheme, a transition occurs at r 0 if
The maximum power for the broadcast-tree is obtained when ζ → 0 which leads to → 0.
Substituting l jk form (40) into (41) and then using l 
The network power for the broadcast-tree a 2 is given by P net (a 2 ) = r 2 + n(1 − r + ) 2 and 
where r 0 is given in (43) . It can be shown that this result is valid for any n = 
